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Abstract
Macroeconomic models used for tax policy analysis often simultaneously ab-
stract from two features of the US tax code: special tax treatment for preferential
capital income, and the joint tax treatment of ordinary capital and labor income.
In this paper, we explore the extent to which explicitly accounting for these tax de-
tails has macroeconomic implications within a heterogeneous-agent model. We do
this by expanding the Moore and Pecoraro (2018) overlapping generations model to
include distinct corporate and non-corporate ﬁrms so that the business income dis-
tributed to households can be separated into ordinary and preferred capital income.
Household income tax treatment is then determined by an internal tax calculator
that fully accounts for interaction among income bases while conditioning on id-
iosyncratic household characteristics. Relative to a conventional approach where
household income taxation is determined by independent labor and capital income
tax functions that do not distinguish between ordinary and preferred capital in-
come, we ﬁnd that our innovations have implications for household behavior and
economic aggregates  especially the tax consequences of changes to the returns
to labor and capital  when analyzing a subset of tax provisions from the recently
enacted Tax Cuts and Jobs Act. Our ﬁndings imply that the abstracting from tax
detail may come at the expense of correctly accounting for incentives and estimating
macroeconomic responses to tax policy changes.
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1 Introduction
Heterogeneous-agent general equilibrium models have become common tools for tax policy
analysis. Despite the rich economic environment in these models, taxation of household
income is conventionally determined by smooth tax functions that do not condition on
household demographics and endogenous tax-preferred choices.1 These tax functions
are typically parameterized using output from a microsimulation outside of the model,
and then exogenously imposed on agents within the model. Moore and Pecoraro (2018b)
embed an internal tax calculator within a heterogeneous-agent model itself, and show that
the conventional framework may oversimplify tax incentives with respect to labor income
by failing to capture certain mechanisms realized through non-convexities and conditional
tax treatments found in the actual tax code. In response to tax policy changes, the tax
function environment can lead to short- and medium-run macroeconomic projections that
diverge from an approach that explicitly models the complex tax code.
In this paper, we highlight an additional shortcoming of the conventional approach:
There lacks an explicit consideration of the special tax treatment of preferential capital
income while simultaneously accounting for the joint tax treatment of ordinary capital
and labor income. Examples of heterogeneous-agent models following this conventional
approach include Nishiyama (2015), Krueger and Ludwig (2016), and Holter et al. (2019),
who consider all capital income received by households as a single base taxed separately
from labor income, with an independent tax function or rate determining the tax liability
from each source of income. Given the dominance of this approach, there exists little
previous work that attempts to incorporate explicit interdependence of capital and labor
income taxes. Kitao (2010) assumes capital income taxes are a decreasing linear function
of labor income, while DeBacker et al. (2019) allow for non-linearities in the relationship
between tax bases. Alternatively, Guner et al. (2011), Guner et al. (2014) and Heathcote
et al. (2017) implicitly account for this interdependence by treating labor and capital
income as a single base with total tax liabilities determined by a single tax function.
None of this work attempts to explicitly account for the special treatment of preferential
capital income. Given the importance that policy-makers have placed on macroeconomic
analysis of tax policy proposals, especially the revenue consequences of such proposals,2
the possible implications of alternate modeling choices should be investigated.
We explore the extent to which explicitly accounting for the detailed taxation of labor
and capital income has macroeconomic implications. We use a large-scale overlapping
generations (OLG) model with an internal tax calculator that explicitly models key tax
provisions in the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) applied to household income. In doing so,
we expand upon the Moore and Pecoraro (2018b) model by including distinct corporate
and non-corporate business entities, where the business income distributed to households
is taxed jointly with labor and other sources of capital income. This framework allows
us to decompose capital income into corporate dividends, pass-through distributions,
interest, and capital gains, ensuring distinction is made between ordinary and preferential
income within the tax calculator. The calculator takes into account the tax-exempt status
of preferred interest income and the special rate schedule applied to qualiﬁed dividends
1Easterly and Rebelo (1993), Gouveia and Struass (1994), Bénabou (2002), Li and Sarte (2004) are
examples of such tax functions. See Guner et al. (2014) for a recent survey of their usage.
2In 2015 the United States House of Representatives adopted a `dynamic scoring' rule, XIII(8)(b),
which was incorporated into a joint Concurrent Budget Resolution for the 114th Congress and reaﬃrmed
in the House for the 115th Congress. This rule requires a point estimate of the revenue eﬀect for certain
proposed legislation that incorporates the response of macroeconomic activity.
2
and gains. Finally, ordinary capital income and labor income are taxed as a single
base explicitly according to the following IRC provisions while conditioning on household
demographics and tax-preferred consumption choices: the statutory tax rate schedule,
special treatment of social security income, personal and dependent exemptions, standard
deduction, earned income credit, child tax credit, home mortgage interest deduction,
state and local income, sales, and property tax deductions, charitable giving deduction,
net investment income and Medicare surtaxes, and the dependent care credit.
Using the internal tax calculator and a conventional tax speciﬁcation each in turn
within the OLG model, we simulate two diﬀerent subsets of the tax law changes contained
in the recently enacted Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA): (i) the individual tax provi-
sions; and (ii) the corporate tax rate reduction.3 We ﬁnd that the modeling choice for
the tax treatment of household income has implications for household savings and labor
supply behavior for both policy changes. In the case of the individual TCJA provisions,
we ﬁnd that explicitly accounting for the change to the structure of deductions combined
with the joint taxation of labor and ordinary capital income results in a dampened re-
sponse of productive capital accumulation relative to the conventional tax system. For
the corporate tax rate reduction, we ﬁnd that the explicit distinction between preferred
and ordinary capital income results in an optimal portfolio re-balancing which lowers
eﬀective tax rates on labor income under joint taxation, generating a larger response of
labor supply relative to the conventional tax system. These results are associated with
quantitatively meaningful diﬀerences across tax systems in economic aggregates, partic-
ularly for the tax revenue consequences of changes to the returns to capital and labor.
Consequentially, accounting for the detailed taxation of labor and capital income should
be considered an important property of heterogeneous-agent models that analyze changes
to tax policy.
2 Model
In this section, we describe a large-scale OLG framework that explicitly models key provi-
sions in the IRC for determining the tax treatment of household income. While we utilize
the demographic structure and household framework developed in Moore and Pecoraro
(2018b), we introduce a two-entity production sector to model distinct corporate and
non-corporate businesses. Unlike a consolidated business sector  where capital income
is an implicit composite of interest, capital gains, and distributions  the two-entity
framework allows for distinct ﬂows of income from corporate dividends, pass-through
distributions, interest and capital gains. This is important because it allows for us to
explicitly account for the special tax treatment of preferential capital income while si-
multaneously capturing the joint tax treatment of labor and ordinary capital income.
The basic market structure captures the interaction of households, two representative
ﬁrms, a representative ﬁnancial intermediary, and government. Households make savings,
consumption, labor, leisure, and residential decisions. The corporate and non-corporate
ﬁrms hire labor directly from households, ﬁnancing their capital investments and pro-
ductive operations through a combination of debt and equity. The ﬁnancial intermediary
pools deposits of ﬁnancial assets from households to make investments in business debt
and equity, consumer debt, mortgage debt, public debt, and rental housing, passing the
3See JCT (2017) for a list of provisions contained in PL 115-97, colloquially known as the Tax Cuts
and Jobs Act.
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return on these investments back to deposit-holding households. Federal, state, and local
governments collect taxes from households and ﬁrms, using the revenue to make consump-
tion expenditures, public capital investment, and transfer payments. With the exception
of mortality risk, all agents have perfect foresight. Population and technological growth
in the model economy is assumed to be exogenous so that the model exhibits a balanced
growth path in trend-stationary form. The model is solved using an algorithm similar to
that described in Appendix C of Moore and Pecoraro (2018b).
2.1 Demographics and Households
The economy is populated with overlapping generations of ﬁnitely-lived households who
are ex ante heterogeneous with respect to family type, single f = s or married f = m, age,
j = 1, . . . , J , labor productivity types, z = 1, . . . , Z, and endowment type, e = 1, . . . , E.
Survival is certain until retirement age j = R such that pij = 1 for j = 1, . . . , R, and
thereafter is uncertain, pij < 1 for j = R + 1, . . . , J − 1, until the maximum age J where
piJ = 0. There is no other form of uncertainty. The population is assumed to grow
exogenously at the gross rate of ΥP .
The complete speciﬁcation of the household optimization problem is described in Sec-
tion 2.2 of Moore and Pecoraro (2018b).4 For purposes of brevity, we only summarize
it here: Households maximize their lifetime utility subject to their budget, borrowing,
minimum consumption and housing constraints. They derive utility from market con-
sumption, housing services, home production, and charitable giving while they experience
disutility and incur child-care expenses from market work. Housing services are realized
from either a rental unit obtained the ﬁnancial intermediary, or from an owner-occupied
home. Home production is generated from hours not spent in market work or leisure.
Charitable giving occurs due to a demographic speciﬁc warm-glow motive. Households
save over their lifecycle by depositing their stock of ﬁnancial assets with a ﬁnancial inter-
mediary, who makes investment decisions on behalf of households, passing all returns back
to households. While the single household only has one potential wage earner, married
households have both a potential primary and secondary earner. Each potential earner in
a households must exit the labor market by the time they reach the exogenous retirement
age, after which they begin to receive social security payments based upon their lifetime
qualiﬁed labor income. Upon death at any age less than J , remaining household wealth
is exogenously apportioned to end-of-life expenditures and accidental bequests.
2.2 Firms
Goods production occurs in two perfectly competitive sectors, corporate and non-corporate,
which diﬀer in terms of tax treatment and the distribution of proﬁts. Firms within each
sector ﬁnance capital expenditures using a combination of bonds and equity obtained
from perfect ﬁnancial markets, hire labor from perfect labor markets, and use these in-
puts to produce output at proﬁt maximizing levels. Output produced within each sector
is assumed to be an identical numéraire good. As in Gervais (2002), Fernánez-Villaverde
and Krueger (2010), and Cho and Francis (2011), the output good can costlessly be trans-
formed by households into a consumption good, owner-occupied housing services, or a
liquid ﬁnancial asset.
4The structure of the household optimization problem in this paper is identical to that used in Moore
and Pecoraro (2018b). Changes to the calibration strategy are detailed in Section A.1.1.
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Growth in technological eﬃciency, At, is assumed to be labor-augmenting to be con-
sistent with a balanced growth path. It evolves identically within each sector according
to At+1 = ΥAAt, where ΥA = (1 + υA) is the exogenous annual gross rate of techno-
logical growth. Production in both sectors is assumed to use constant returns to scale
Cobb-Douglas technology, with the following aggregate production function:
Y qt = Z
q(Gt)
g(Kqt )
α(AtN
q
t )
1−α−g for q = c, n (2.1)
where Gt = G
fed
t +G
sl
t is the sum of beginning-of-period public capital owned by the fed-
eral, state and local governments, Kqt and N
q
t are beginning-of-period productive private
capital and eﬀective labor employed in each sector q = c, n, and Zq is a scale parameter.
We follow Lynde and Richmond (1992), Lansing (1998), and Cassou and Lansing (1998)
with our inclusion of public capital as a complement to private inputs in an aggregate
production function with constant returns to scale. Since there are then decreasing re-
turns to scale for private factors, we are able to obtain an interior solution with our two
ﬁrm - single output good framework. Moreover, the presence of a public factor input
along with our assumption of perfect ﬁnancial and labor markets leads to economic rents
which are fully captured by ﬁrms.
An endogenous share Λct < 1 of aggregate eﬀective labor, determined by the equal-
ization of cross-sector marginal products of labor under perfect labor markets, is em-
ployed in the corporate sector with the residual share Λnt = 1 − Λct employed in the
non-corporate sector. Corporate and non-corporate labor inputs are then N ct = Λ
c
tNt
and Nnt = (1− Λct)Nt respectively.
We assume a one-period time-to-build for investment in productive private capital,
so that the capital used for production in the current period is predetermined by invest-
ment decisions from the previous period. Furthermore, investment decisions that cause
deviations from the steady state rate of capital accumulation generate adjustment costs
subject to the convex cost function Ξt:
Kqt+1 = (1− δK)Kqt + Iqt − Ξqt for q = c, n (2.2)
Ξqt =
ξK
2
(
Iqt
Kqt
−ΥPΥA + 1− δK)2Kqt for q = c, n (2.3)
Finally, it is assumed that the debt portion of total resources used to ﬁnance invest-
ment in each sector is an exogenous ratio of the private capital stock:
Bqt = κb,qK
q
t for q = c, n (2.4)
where Bqt is the beginning-of-period net stock of debt held by the representative ﬁrm in
sector q. While we assume the debt ratio κb,q is exogenous, its value may be speciﬁed to
change in response to particular tax policy changes deemed to inﬂuence ﬁrm ﬁnancing
decisions.
2.2.1 Corporate Sector
The corporate ﬁrm ﬁnances expenditures with debt (bonds) and equity (stock shares).
Proﬁt is remitted back to shareholders through dividends. Gains are realized when the
value of corporate shares increase. As in Poterba and Summers (1984) and Hubbard
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et al. (1995), the after-tax rate of return to the marginal investor-household Rct depends
on both capital gains gnsct and dividend payouts divt occurring in period t:
Rct =
(1− τ gt )gnsct + (1− τ dt )divt
V ct
(2.5)
where τ gt is the aggregate accrual-equivalent tax rate on capital gains, and τ
d
t is an
aggregate tax rate on dividends. The value of the representative corporate ﬁrm at time t
is V ct . Capital gains are equal to the change in the value of the ﬁrm less the value of new
share issues, shrt:
gnsct = V
c
t+1 − V ct − shrt (2.6)
The ﬁrm's objective is to choose the time path of private capital Kct and hire the
quantity of eﬀective labor input N ct that maximize the ﬁrm's value at time t. Rearrang-
ing equation (2.5) for V ct and solving forward gives the ﬁrm's objective function below.
Letting βct ≡ 1−τ
g
t
Rct+1−τgt , the corporate ﬁrm will maximize:
V ct (K
c
t ) = max
Nct ,K
c
t+1
(1− τ dt )divt − (1− τ gt )shrt
Rct + 1− τ gt
+ βctV
c
t+1(K
c
t+1) (2.7)
subject to:
1. a cash ﬂow restriction:
ernct +B
c
t+1 −Bct + shrt = divt + Ict + txlct + sltct , ∀s, (2.8)
2. the law of motion for capital in equation (2.2),
3. the debt issues rule in equation (2.4), and
4. the dividend payout rule in equation (2.9) deﬁned below.
where the cash ﬂow restriction in equation (2.8) states that the corporate ﬁrm's intra-
period inﬂows  earnings ernct , new debt issues B
c
t+1−Bct , and new share issues shrt 
must be equal to outﬂows  dividend payments divt, investment in productive capital
Ict . federal tax liabilities txl
c
t , and state and local tax liabilities slt
c
t .
As in Zodrow and Diamond (2013) the dividend payout ratio κd is assumed to be
exogenous, which is here expressed relative to earnings ernct less federal tax liability txl
c
t :
divt = κd(ernct − txlct ) (2.9)
Similar to the exogenous debt to physical capital ratio, the dividend payout ratio κd may
be speciﬁed to change in response to a new tax policy regime.
Corporate earnings are equal to revenue from production, less wages paid and interest
paid on debt:
ernct = Y
c
t − wtN ct − itBct (2.10)
Corporate tax liabilities at the federal level is equal to the federal corporate aggregate
eﬀective marginal tax rate, τ ct , times the taxable earnings base less credits:
txlct = τ
c
t (Y
c
t − wtN ct − dedct)− crdct (2.11)
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where dedct and crd
c
t are the corporate ﬁrm's tax deductions are credits respectively.
Lastly, corporate tax liabilities at the state and local level are assumed to be propor-
tional to corporate earnings for simplicity:
sltct = τ
slc
t ern
c
t (2.12)
2.2.2 Non-corporate Sector
While the non-corporate ﬁrm explicitly issues debt in a similar fashion to the corporate
ﬁrm, shares of equity in the non-corporate ﬁrm are implicit in net distributions, dstt. Net
distributions additionally incorporate the portion of earnings that are passed through to
ﬁrm's owners and taxed at the household level. We therefore specify that from the view of
the marginal investor-household, the after-tax rate of return to non-corporate ﬁrm equity,
Rnt , depends both on capital gains, gns
n
t , and aggregate pass-through distributions net
of tax liabilities dst− txln:
Rnt =
(1− τ gt )gnsnt + dstt − txln
V nt
(2.13)
where capital gains are the change in the value of the non-corporate ﬁrm:
gnsnt = V
n
t+1 − V nt (2.14)
Similar to the corporate ﬁrm, the objective function of the non-corporate ﬁrm is
derived by solving equation 2.13 forward. Letting βnt ≡ (1−τ
g
t )
Rnt +1−τgt , the objective of the
non-corporate ﬁrm is to choose labor and private capital inputs to maximize:
V nt (K
n
t ) = max
Nnt ,K
n
t+1
(
dstt − txln
Rnt + 1− τ gt
)
+ βnt V
n
t+1(K
n
t+1) (2.15)
subject to:
1. the cash ﬂow restriction
ernnt +B
n
t+1 −Bnt = dstt + Int ∀s, (2.16)
2. the law of motion for capital in equation (2.2), and
3. the debt issues rule in equation (2.4).
As with the corporate ﬁrm, earnings are equal to revenue less wages and interest
payments on outstanding debt:
ernnt = Y
n
t − wtNnt − itBnt (2.17)
The aggregate tax liability for non-corporate income txlnt is equal to the non-corporate
aggregate eﬀective marginal tax rate, τnt , times the taxable earnings base less credits:
txlnt = τ
n
t (Y
n
t − wtNnt − dednt )− crdnt (2.18)
Unlike the corporate ﬁrm, the non-corporate ﬁrm is not liable for taxes at the business-
entity level and txlnt therefore does not enter the government's budget constraint directly.
Rather, non-corporate distributions are passed through to the household-level where they
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are taxed jointly with households' other income and collected by the government. A
description of our method for incorporating these tax liabilities at the household level is
discussed in Section 2.4.
2.3 Financial Intermediary
The ﬁnancial sector is perfectly competitive, consisting of an arbitrarily large set of
inﬁnitely-lived ﬁnancial intermediaries with the technology to pool savings from house-
holds and invest in ﬁnancial assets and rental property. The sector is summarized here
with a representative intermediary, which will be liable to households for beginning-of-
period deposits Dt plus a portfolio return Dtr
p
t , and will collect new deposits Dt+1 for
which it decides an investment allocation. These new deposits may be allocated across
corporate and non-corporate equity V ct+1 and V
n
t+1, corporate and non-corporate bonds
Bct+1 and B
n
t+1, federal government bonds B
g
t+1, and rental housing property H
r
t . The
equations of motion for the stock of rental housing and bond holdings are as follows:
Hrt = (1− δr)Hrt−1 + Irt (2.19)
Bqt+1 = B
q
t + ∆B
q
t , q = c, n, g (2.20)
where investment in rental housing chosen by the ﬁnancial intermediary is denoted Irt ,
and net bonds purchased by the intermediary from the government, corporate, and non-
corporate ﬁrms are denoted ∆Bqt , q = c, n, g.
While corporate and non-corporate bonds yield a pretax rate of return of it, we
assume that investment in government bonds yields a low, safe pretax rate of return
ρt, which depends positively on the change to the federal deﬁcit to output ratio from the
corresponding steady state value:
ρt = $ + ς exp
(
∆Bgt
Yt
− ∆B
g
SS
YSS
)
(2.21)
The intermediary rents current housing services at a price of prt and incurs expenses from
the economic depreciation of last period's rental housing capital at rate δr.
The intermediary directly holds equity and bonds in both the corporate and non-
corporate sectors, as well as government bonds and rental housing assets, all of which
are ﬁnanced by household deposits. As a result, the intermediary's income includes
dividends, distributions, capital gains, interest from bond holdings, and rent payments
net of economic depreciation. Expenses include the purchase of new debt, equity or rental
housing, plus the beginning-of-period principal and return on deposits remitted back to
households.
For notational ease, we deﬁne the representative ﬁnancial intermediary's income as:
Inct ≡ divt + dstt + gnsct + gnsnt + prtHrt − δrHrt−1 + ρtBgt + itBct + itBct (2.22)
It is assumed that the intermediary does not discount the future, so intertemporal proﬁt
can be written as:
Πt =
∞∑
s=t
Incs− (1 + rps)Dt−∆V cs −∆V ns −∆Bgs −∆Bcs −∆Bns −∆Hrs−1 +Ds+1 (2.23)
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where ∆Hrt−1 ≡ Hrt −Hrt−1. In each period the intermediary is constrained by:
Dt+1 = V
c
t+1 + V
n
t+1 +B
g
t+1 +B
c
t+1 +B
n
t+1 +H
r
t ∀t (2.24)
which states that the end-of-period stock of investments plus current rental housing prop-
erty held by the intermediary must be equal the end-of-period stock of savings deposited
by households. The representative ﬁnancial intermediary has the objective to use deposits
to choose an optimal investment allocation on behalf of households, internalizing their
aggregate tax consequences. A characteristic of the optimal allocation is that no arbitrage
opportunities exist. This no-arbitrage condition implies that the after-tax marginal rate
of return from across corporate and non-corporate equity and debt, as well as on rental
housing, will be equalized:
Rct = R
n
t = (1− τ it )it = (1− τ rt )prt − δr (2.25)
which yields the following rental housing price:
prt =
(1− τ it )it + δr
(1− τ rt )
(2.26)
where τ it and τ
r
t are the aggregate eﬀective marginal tax rates on interest and rental
income.
Perfect competition in the ﬁnancial market implies a within-period zero-proﬁt con-
dition for the representative intermediary. Setting Πt = 0 for s = t in equation (2.23),
using the budgeting constraint in equation (2.24) to eliminate, and solving for the return
on deposits yields:
rptDt = Inct (2.27)
which is the total pretax capital income received by households. The pretax portfolio
rate of return rpt is received by households with positive savings, or charged as the rate
of interest for households who borrow, since the intermediary will be indiﬀerent between
investing and lending on the margin.
2.4 Government
2.4.1 Household Income Taxation
In this section we detail the tax treatment of household income, which involves the
speciﬁcation of a federal labor income taxes, capital income taxes, payroll taxes, state
and local taxes, and the special tax treatment of social security beneﬁts. We describe the
general framework of household income taxation under our internal tax calculator, with
the conventional speciﬁcation described in Section 4.
We denote iz,ft,j as the economic wage income for working-age households or the social
security income for retired households, and az,ft,j as the deposits of ﬁnancial assets held by
the ﬁnancial intermediary of a household so that rpt a
z,f
t,j is the ﬂow of economic capital in-
come, which is composed of the diﬀerent capital income types indexed by k ∈ {dividends,
distributions, interest, capital gains, rental income}.
To ensure the correct tax base, we use a (z, f) demographic speciﬁc `calibration ratio'
to scale particular ﬂow of economic income which may be subject to taxation, with χi,z,f
used for labor income, and χo,z,fk used for each particular capital income type, k, that
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is treated as ordinary. We obtain adjusted gross labor income, iˆz,ft,j , and adjusted gross
ordinary capital income, rpt aˆ
o,z,f
t,j , as follows:
iˆz,ft,j ≡ χi,z,f iz,ft,j
rpt aˆ
o,z,f
t,j ≡ rpt
(∑
k
χo,z,fk s
o
t,k
)
az,ft,j
(2.28)
where so,kt is the share of total portfolio income for ordinary capital income type k. We
can then deﬁne adjusted gross ordinary income as:
ordz,ft,j ≡ iˆz,ft,j + rpt aˆo,z,ft,j (2.29)
The portion of economic capital income not treated as ordinary is instead treated as
preferred capital income, pciz,ft,j . Adjusted gross preferred capital income is obtained by
applying a calibration ratios χp,z,fk :
pciz,ft,j ≡ rpt
(∑
k
χp,z,fk s
p
t,k
)
az,ft,j (2.30)
where sp,kt is the share of total portfolio income for capital income type k is treated as
preferential, with the aggregate consistency condition Σk
(
sot,k + s
p
t,k
)
= 1. A households'
tax liability on preferential capital income depends on their total adjusted gross income
and a statutory rate schedule. We deﬁne this relationship with the following function:
citz,ft,j = q(ord
z,f
t,j , pci
z,f
t,j ) (2.31)
A given household's net tax income liability T z,ft,j is equal to taxes owed on ordinary
income, oitz,ft,j , plus tax liability on preferred capital income, cit
z,f
t,j , plus tax liabilities asso-
ciated with the Social Security system for retirees, τ prt,j iˆ
z,f
t,j , less federal transfer payments,
trsz,ft,j , plus state and local tax liabilities, slt
z,f
t,j .
T z,ft,j = oitz,ft,j + citz,ft,j + τ prt,j iˆz,ft,j − trsz,ft,j + sltz,ft,j (2.32)
Household tax liability on ordinary income, oitz,ft,j , is determined by application of a
statutory marginal tax rate schedule, deductions, and credits. This mapping from choice
variables, state variables and demographic characteristics to a tax liability is developed
to be as close to the actual IRC as possible for the provisions modeled. The eﬀective
marginal tax rate is therefore not the statutory tax rate, but the marginal liability on
incremental labor income after these deductions and credits have been applied.
The average tax rate on ordinary income before tax credits, τ ot , is determined by the
statutory tax rate schedule in the tax calculator, ordinary income ordz,ft,j , and deductions
dedz,ft,j . Deductions vary, as some are a function of labor income only, others consider
broader income sources, and some are a function of tax-preferred consumption choices
made by the household. All variables aﬀecting possible deductions are listed in equation
2.35. Due to the refundability of some credits, crdz,ft,j is a function of various income
deﬁnitions, deductions themselves, and also child care costs, κz,ft,j . Formally, ordinary
income tax liability is given by:
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oitz,ft,j = max
{
τ ot ord
z,f
t,j , 0
}
− crdz,ft,j − traz,ft (2.33)
τ ot = τ (ord
z,f
t,j − dedz,ft,j ) (2.34)
dedz,ft,j = d(ˆi
z,f
t,j , ord
z,f
t,j , pci
z,f
t,j , h
o
t,j, c
g
t,j) (2.35)
crdz,ft,j = c(ˆi
z,f
t,j , ord
z,f
t,j , ded
z,f
t,j , pci
z,f
t,j , κ
z,f
t,j ) (2.36)
traz,ft =

a(ˆiz,ft,j ) if nj > 0 and f = s
a(ˆiz,ft,j ) if n
1
j > 0 and f = m
0 otherwise
(2.37)
where bold emphasis denotes a function. The last term in equation (2.33), is a pro-
ductivity type - family composition speciﬁc transfer payment traz,ft , which is used as a
non-distortionary method of ensuring that households within a given (z, f) demographic
group on average face a target average tax rate on labor income. This transfer may
be positive or negative for diﬀerent household groups, and is only nonzero for working
households.
Preferred capital income sources are taxed at various rates, with a progressive schedule
in the case of gains and dividends. This mapping, like that for ordinary income tax
liabilities, is developed to be as close to the actual IRC as possible. Under this tax
system, households consider the tax implications of their realized capital income when
making their joint labor supply and savings decisions.
Working households pay into the Social Security program at proportional payroll tax
rate on labor income each period, which applies to all taxable labor income up to a
speciﬁed threshold. Formally:
τ prt,j = p
(
iˆz,ft,j
)
if j ≤ R (2.38)
The payroll tax functions are independent of demographic characteristics other than age.
2.4.2 Federal Government
Total taxes collected by the federal government, T fedt ≡ txlhht + txlct + txlbeqt , are the sum
of tax receipts collected from households, from corporations, and on accidental bequests,
respectively. These receipts, along with bond issues, are used to ﬁnance non-valued
public consumption, Cfedt , capital expenditures, I
fed
t , and transfer payments to households
TRfedt . The recursive budget constraint of the federal government is written as:
Ifedt + C
fed
t + TR
fed
t ≤ T fedt +Bgt+1 − (1 + ρt)Bgt (2.39)
where the law of motion for federal public capital follows:
Gfedt+1 = (1− δg)Gfedt + Ifedt (2.40)
Equation (2.39) states that federal public expenditures on non-valued consumption and
capital can be no larger than total tax revenue net of transfer payments plus new debt
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issues, Bgt+1 − Bgt , less interest paid on old debt ρtBgt . To rule out explosive debt paths,
we maintain the no-Ponzi condition:
lim
k→∞
Bgt+k∏k−1
s=0(1 + ρt+s)
= 0 (2.41)
which implies that the current stock of debt is equal to the present-discounted value of
all future primary surpluses along any equilibrium path.
Total income taxes collected by the federal government from households, txlhht consist
of tax liabilities from both ordinary and preferred income, which include distributions
from non-corporate business entities, as well as payroll taxes and tax liabilities on social
security income:
txlhht =
∫
Z
∫
J
∑
f=s,m
(
oitz,ft,j + cit
z,f
t,j + τ
pr
t iˆ
z,f
t,j
)
Ωz,ft,j dj dz (2.42)
Total income taxes collected by the federal government from corporations, txlct , are de-
ﬁned in equation (2.11) and repeated here for convenience:
txlct = τ
c
t (Y
c
t − wtN ct − dedct)− crdct
Taxes are collected on accidental bequests left by deceased households. We specify that
the tax rate τ beqt is linear in bequests and unrelated to either the benefactor or beneﬁ-
ciary household's other income. Letting yt+1,j+1 denote the sum of a given household's
end-of-period ﬁnancial wealth at+1,j+1 and owner-occupied housing wealth h
o
t+1,j+1, taxes
collected on accidental bequests can be expressed as:
txlbeqt = τ
beq
t (1− Λ)
∫
Z
∫
J
(1− pij)
∑
f=s,m
yt+1,j+1Ω
z,f
t,j dj dz (2.43)
where Λ is a parameter that accounts for end-of-life consumption expenditures by the
newly deceased.
In addition to social security payments to retirees, ssz,ft,j , households receive transfer
payments from the federal government trsz,ft,j ≡ trlt + lstt + trwz,ft,j where, as speciﬁed
in Moore and Pecoraro (2018b), is the sum of lump-sum transfers, lump-sum taxes,
and conditional welfare transfers respectively. Aggregate federal government transfers
therefore can be expressed as:
TRfedt =
∫
Z
∫
J
∑
f=s,m
(
ssz,ft,j + trs
z,f
t,j
)
Ωz,ft,j dj dz (2.44)
2.4.3 State and Local Government
Total taxes collected by the composite state and local government T slt are the sum of
tax receipts collected from households and corporations. These receipts are assumed to
be spent on non-valued state and local composite government consumption expenditures
Cslt and investment in productive public capital I
sl
t . We specify an intraperiod balanced-
budget constraint such that:
Islt + C
sl
t = T
sl
t (2.45)
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where the law of motion for state and local public capital follows:
Gslt+1 = (1− δg)Gslt + Islt (2.46)
Tax liabilities owed by households at the state and local level are assumed to be
proportional to taxable labor income and owner-occupied housing:
sltz,ft,j ≡ τ slt iˆz,ft,j + τ slpt hot,j (2.47)
where τ slt is a linear tax rate taken to represent potentially deductible state and local
income and sales tax and τ slpt is a linear average tax rate on owner-occupied property.
Tax liabilities owed by corporations at the state and local level were speciﬁed in equation
(2.12) but repeated here for convenience:
sltct = τ
slc
t ern
c
t
Aggregate state and local taxes can therefore be expressed as:
T slt =
∫
Z
∫
J
∑
f=s,m
sltz,ft,j Ω
z,f
t,j dj dz + slt
c
t (2.48)
2.5 Equilibrium
Equilibrium is formally deﬁned in Appendix B in terms of a trend-stationary transforma-
tion of the model. Here, we informally deﬁne an equilibrium as a collection of household
decision rules that maximize households' utility subject to household budget constraints;
a collection of economic aggregates that are consistent with household behavior and the
associated measure of households; proﬁt-maximizing behavior by the corporate and non-
corporate ﬁrms; a set of prices that facilitate cross-sector price-equalization and clearing
in factor, asset, and goods markets; and an associated set of policy aggregates that are
consistent with budget constraints of the federal, state and local governments. When in
trend-stationary form, our model exhibits an equilibrium balanced growth path.
3 Baseline Calibration
The set of parameters to be calibrated include both non-tax and tax policy parameters,
both of which rely heavily on use of the Joint Committee on Taxations' Individual Tax
Model (ITM) for speciﬁcation, which makes use of data from individual tax returns ﬁled
with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and compiled by the IRS Statistics of Income
(SOI) Division.5 In calibrating the model, we vary the use of long-run historical data,
recent observations, and projections to construct parameter values in targeting the 2017
United States economic environment and tax law as closely as possible for the initial
steady-state baseline equilibrium. In using 2017 as the initial year, we ensure that the
projected eﬀects of Public Law 115-97 are not incorporated our initial baseline.
5For a description of the Joint Committee on Taxation's Individual Tax Model, see JCT (2015)
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3.1 Non-Tax Policy Parameters and Targets
The calibration strategy for household demographics, characteristics, and preference gen-
erally follows that described in Appendix A of Moore and Pecoraro (2018b); any devia-
tions from the prior calibration strategy are described in Section A.1.1. Select exogenous
parameters used are summarized in Table A1, with key aggregate targets for labor supply,
business capital accumulation, and housing capital accumulation are summarized in Ta-
bles A2 and A3. The calibration strategy for the production sector and non-tax portion
of government in our economy is described Sections A.1.2 and A.1.3.
3.2 Tax Policy Parameters and Targets
The set of aggregate eﬀective marginal tax rates, which apply to aggregate corporate
income, non-corporate income, pass-through income, dividend income, interest income,
and capital gains are exogenously set to those values computed by the ITM for year
2017. In addition to wage expense, both the corporate and non-corporate ﬁrms are
able to deduct from taxable income their interest expense, depreciation of capital assets,
and state and local tax liabilities in the initial baseline. So that corporate and non-
corporate tax liabilities relative to output each match an empirical counterpart for 2017,
we endogenously calibrate a lump-sum credit. For the corporate ﬁrm we target the tax
liability to output ratio estimated by the Congressional Budget Oﬃce (CBO) in the The
Budget and Economic Outlook: 2017 to 2027 for 2017, and for the non-corporate ﬁrm we
target that ratio estimated by the ITM for 2017.
The internal tax calculator, speciﬁed in Section 2.4.1 explicitly models the following
individual tax provisions in the Internal Revenue Code of 2017: the statutory tax rate
schedule for ordinary income, statutory tax rate schedule for preferential income, special
treatment of social security income, personal and dependent exemptions, standard deduc-
tion, earned income credit, child tax credit, home mortgage interest deduction, state and
local income, sales, and property tax deductions, charitable giving deduction, net invest-
ment income and Medicare surtaxes, and the dependent care credit.
To ensure that the internal tax calculator produces household capital income tax
liabilities to output ratios that are consistent with those estimated by the ITM for each
capital income type for 2017, we endogenously compute values for the calibration ratios
χo,z,fk and χ
p,z,f
k over the k dimension.
6 These values are exogenously scaled over the z
dimension to match the relative values of taxable capital income estimated by the ITM
for the average household of each productivity demographic.
The share total portfolio income attributed to each capital income type k to be treated
as ordinary, sot,k, or preferential, s
p
t,k, are computed as the product of two terms. Let µt,k
denote the endogenous share of total portfolio income for a given capital income type k,
so that
∑
µk = 1. Next, let µ¯
o
t,k denote the exogenous share of a given capital income
type k that is treated as ordinary for tax purposes, which is estimated by the ITM for
2017. The portfolio shares for each k can then be obtained as follows:
sot,k = µ¯
o
t,kµt,k
spt,k = (1− µ¯ot,k)µt,k
6Note that this procedure ensures that the aggregate tax liabilities internalized by the non-corporate
ﬁrm at the business-entity level match those remitted to the government by households.
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where by construction the aggregate consistency condition Σk
(
sot,k + s
p
t,k
)
= 1 holds.
The calibration ratio for labor income χi,z,f is computed as the ratio of wages in
adjusted gross income to a NIPA-comparable wage income concept for each (z, f) demo-
graphic as computed by the ITM.7 To ensure that the average federal income tax rates
for the average household in each (z, f) demographic in the model match those computed
by the ITM, we set traz,f endogenously in the initial steady state as described in Sec-
tion 3.1.1 of Moore and Pecoraro (2018b). As in the previous work, the OASDI portion
payroll tax rate of 12.4% applies to labor income up to the 2017 tax-law threshold. The
OASDI-taxable income base is adjusted uniformly across taxpayers so that payroll tax
receipts relative to output are about 4.4% as estimated by CBO for 2017.
Speciﬁcation of the federal transfer payments trsz,fj , the linear tax rate on bequests
τ beq, and the linear state and local tax rate τ sl follow from Section 3.1 of Moore and
Pecoraro (2018b), using year 2017 targets instead of those from 2018 for the initial steady
state baseline. The state and local property tax rate τ slp is set to 0.0105×0.7174 = 0.0075,
which is the product of the national average property tax rate computed using state-level
estimates from the National Association of Homebuilders for 2010-2014, and the average
portion of total residential capital that is not consumer durables as reported by NIPA
for 2007-2016. Finally, the linear state and local tax rate on corporate income τ slc is
endogenously set to target a ratio of state and local corporate income tax receipts to
output 0.0038, which is the 2007-2016 average computed from NIPA estimates.
4 Conventional Household-level Tax Speciﬁcation
This section describes a conventional tax speciﬁcation (CTS) for household-level income
tax treatment, used for purposes of comparison to the internal tax calculator. We spec-
ify this tax system to exhibit three characteristics common to macroeconomic models of
tax policy: (i) smooth and continuous tax functions used to determine tax liabilities on
household income; (ii) labor and capital income treated as separate tax bases; (iii) cap-
ital income taxed in composite form, without distinction between income from business,
interest, dividend, or capital gains for purposes of preferential tax treatment.
As in Moore and Pecoraro (2018b), for the taxation of labor income we specify the
Bénabou (2002) tax function, a commonly-used tax function for wage income that gener-
ates smooth average tax rates and eﬀective marginal tax rates over income (Guner et al.,
2014; Heathcote et al., 2017; Holter et al., 2019). This function is continuously diﬀeren-
tiable, allows for negative average tax rates to capture the eﬀect of refundable tax credits,
and is easily parameterized with the exogenous speciﬁcation of an eﬀective marginal tax
rate and average tax rate at the desired level of aggregation. It takes the following form:
witz,ft,j = iˆ
z,f
t,j − λf1 (ˆiz,ft,j )1−λ
f
2 (4.1)
where λf1 and λ
f
2 are parameters which together determine the income-weighted aver-
age tax rate and eﬀective marginal tax rate applied to labor income at for each family
composition.
Average tax rates on capital income are determined the by age group - family com-
position speciﬁc tax functions used in Moore and Pecoraro (2018b), where a unique
function estimated each for working single, working married, retired single, and retired
7See Section A.1.1 for a description of the NIPA-comparable wage income concept.
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married household. We assume that a household's average tax rate on capital income is a
monotonically increasing function of their asset holdings relative to the asset distribution
f(at|f, j), conditional on family composition and age.8 These functions allow households'
tax liability on capital income, which may vary signiﬁcantly over their lifecycle, to be in-
dependent of their permanent productivity type. We assume that this function takes a
quadratic form:
τat = q0
f
j + q1
f
j (a
z,f
t,j ) + q2
f
j (a
z,f
t,j )
2 (4.2)
While payroll taxes are levied in the same manner as speciﬁed in equation (2.38),
the special tax treatment of the Security Security income received by retired households
is captured using (z, f) demographic speciﬁc exogenous average tax rates applied that
income. We denote the tax rates associated with the retirement system as τ prt,j
τ prt,j =
p
(
iˆz,ft,j
)
if j ≤ R
r
(
ssz,ft,j
)
if j > R
(4.3)
Under this alternative tax system, total household tax liabilities are given by the
following:
T z,ft,j = witz,ft,j + τat a˜z,ft,j rpt + τ prt,j iˆz,ft,j − traz,ft − trsz,ft,j + sltz,ft,j (4.4)
where trsz,ft,j are as speciﬁed as in Section 2.4.2 and slt
z,f
t,j is as speciﬁed in equation (2.47).
The transfers traz,ft are used as a non-distortionary method of targeting changes to the
average tax rate on labor income for (z, f) demographic group following a policy change.
For initial steady state calibration of the Bénabou tax function, capital income tax
function, and retirement tax framework, we follow that strategy described in Section 3.1.1
and 4.1 of Moore and Pecoraro (2018b) while choosing 2017 as the initial year over 2018.
5 Policy Experiments
We analyze the transition path following implementation of two diﬀerent subsets of tax
changes contained in the recently enacted Tax Cuts and Jobs Act": (i) the individual
tax provisions; and (ii) the corporate rate reduction. These experiments are performed
using the internal tax calculator (ITC) as described in Section 2.4.1 and conventional
tax speciﬁcation (CTS) as described in Section 4, each in turn, beginning from an initial
steady state associated with 2017 tax law. TCJA provisions are considered separately to
focus on two diﬀerent model features: (i) the tax detail for ordinary income in the case
individual tax changes and (ii) distinctions of various capital income types, and the joint
taxation of labor and ordinary capital income in the case of the corporate rate reduction.
In comparing the ITC and the CTS tax systems, we ﬁrst look at deviations in
household-level choices and then connect these deviations to their macroeconomic con-
sequences. We report aggregate variables over the ﬁrst ten years following the policy
change to coincide with the `budget window' used by the United States Congress to
inform legislative decision-making.
8Since all households face the same rate of return on deposits and calibration ratios applied to capital
income, an ordering of households by capital assets is equivalent to an ordering of households by taxable
capital income.
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As in Moore and Pecoraro (2018b), the announcement and implementation of a new
tax policy occurs in `year 1', and is assumed to be unanticipated in the `year 0' initial
steady state. Following the policy change, agents in the model have perfect foresight
regarding the future time path of policy and the economy. Federal budget deﬁcits or
surpluses generated by the new policy are ﬁnanced by borrowing or used to pay down
existing debt for the ﬁrst 30 years following the policy change. To ensure that the Federal
budget is on a sustainable debt path in the long-run as the economy reaches a ﬁnal steady
state, adjustments to non-valued government consumption expenditures and lump-sum
transfers are phased in over years 31 through 40.9
5.1 Calibrating Tax Instruments for Policy Changes
Both the ITC and the CTS are calibrated for a given policy change by adjusting the
relevant tax instruments while holding constant income, aggregates, and choice vari-
ables associated with the initial steady state present-law equilibrium. The revenue eﬀect
achieved within the model is thus consistent with the notion of a `conventional revenue ef-
fect'.10 For each tax system, tax instruments are adjusted to target the total conventional
revenue eﬀect over 2018-2027 as reported in JCT (2017).
While the changes to the taxation of household income diﬀer across tax systems as
described below, tax changes at the ﬁrm and aggregate level are made identically under
both the ITC and the CTS. Speciﬁcally, we change the aggregate marginal tax rates on
corporate income, non-corporate income, interest income, capital gains, and dividends
in the model to target the portion of the total conventional revenue eﬀect due to each
respective change. For example, if the portion of the total conventional revenue eﬀect due
to the corporate rate reduction is some x dollars over the budget, the marginal tax rate τ ct
is changed to generate a within-model revenue eﬀect of x dollars over the budget window,
holding the initial baseline equilibrium corporate tax base constant. Any changes to
deductions and credits allowed to ﬁrms are made in a similar manner.
5.1.1 Internal Tax Calculator
Changes to the taxation of household income under the ITC are explicitly incorporated
in the tax calculator as speciﬁed by the policy change. For example, when calibrating the
model for the individual provisions in TCJA, we replace the original statutory tax rate
schedule applied to ordinary income in the internal tax calculator with the new statu-
tory tax rate schedule under TCJA. Following the explicit changes made within the tax
calculator, we make two further adjustments: First, we adjust transfer payments traz,ft
to target the distribution of the conventional revenue eﬀect across (z, f) demographics as
predicted by the ITM over the budget window. Second, we adjust the calibration ratios
for both ordinary and preferential capital income, χo,z,fk and χ
p,z,f
k , to target the average
budget-window revenue eﬀect attributed to each source of capital income. These adjust-
ments ensure that we match the targeted conventional revenue eﬀect at the aggregate
level and decomposed across demographics and type of income.
9Delayed adjustment of ﬁscal instruments to maintain ﬁscal sustainability minimizes the within-
budget-window noise introduced by the speciﬁc `ﬁscal closure' rule chosen. See Moore and Pecoraro
(2018a) for a discussion.
10The conventional revenue eﬀect is the estimated change in tax receipts from those projected under a
present law baseline forecast, holding constant gross national product. See JCT (2011) for more details.
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5.1.2 Conventional Tax Speciﬁcation
Changes to aggregate average and eﬀective marginal tax rates applied to household labor
income are made by re-parameterizing the Bénabou (2002) tax function to match those
changes due to the proposal as predicted by the ITM for each f demographic over the
budget window. We allow for the parameters {λf1 , λf2} to be time-varying to capture dif-
ferent magnitudes of these aggregate rate changes over the budget window. The transfers
traz,ft , set to zero in the initial baseline under the CTS, are set to target the distribution
of the conventional revenue eﬀect across (z, f) demographics as predicted by the ITM.
Changes to the taxation of household capital income are made by re-estimating equation
(4.2) using the average tax rates on capital income under the proposal as predicted by
the ITM for each (f, j) demographic over the budget window. We scale the total change
in average tax rates to match the portion of the total conventional revenue eﬀect due to
capital income changes.
5.2 Policy Experiment 1: Individual Tax Provisions of TCJA
We simulate the enactment of the individual tax provisions as reported in Title I of JCT
(2017), most of which became eﬀective beginning in 2018 and are scheduled to sunset
in 2025. Key among these provisions, all of which are modeled explicitly with the tax
calculator, are changes to the statutory rate schedule on ordinary income, expansion of
the standard deduction, modiﬁcation of itemized deductions, 20% deduction of qualiﬁed
business income for pass-through entities, repeal of personal exemptions, and expansion
of the child tax credit. The total conventional revenue loss of the individual tax changes
was estimated to be $1.126 trillion over ﬁscal years 2018-2027 in JCT (2017), which is
matched under both the ITC and CTS tax systems.
5.2.1 Household Behavior
The decrease in statutory tax rates on ordinary income combined with the near doubling
of the standard deduction drive diﬀerences in micro-level behavior across tax systems.
While the statutory rate reduction decreases eﬀective marginal and average tax rates on
ordinary income for those households who had taxable income prior to the policy change,
the larger standard deduction expands the eﬀective zero bracket for households without
taxable income and reduces the tax base for households with taxable income. The lowest
productivity households who typically earn annual labor income around or below the
expanded standard deduction amount in the initial baseline, increase average labor hours
over 2018-202511 by 0.6% for singles and 2.1% for married households relative to baseline
under the ITC; these groups decrease hours by -0.6% and -1.2% relative to baseline under
the CTS. The remainder of single and married households  middle- to high-productivity
types  change average hours by -0.1% and 1.5% respectively under the ITC, and by
0.1% and 2.1% under the CTS over the same period. The relatively smaller labor supply
response of high-productivity workers under the ITC is due to the joint taxation of labor
and ordinary capital income, a feature of this tax environment which can also dampen
the savings response when labor income is increasing.
The expansion of the standard deduction reduces the number of households who
itemize deductions, and the reduction in the statutory tax rates reduces the value of
11We focus on this subset of the budget window as the temporary provisions sunset beginning in 2026.
18
itemized deductions for those still itemizing. Together, these policy changes most directly
aﬀect the tax-preferred consumption behavior of high-income households who are more
likely to itemize deductions for home mortgage interest and charitable giving. Following
the policy change, these households face incentives to purchase relatively smaller homes,
or remain in a rental unit longer before buying a home, and to reduce charitable giving.
Figure 1 displays the aggregate quantities of these tax-preferred consumption choices
over time under both tax systems, showing that the explicit modeling of these provisions
under the ITC captures the new disincentives. Under the ITC, households have a 0.9
percentage point lower stock of owner-occupied housing than under the CTS on average
each year over 2018-2025. Similarly, charitable giving is 4.6 percentage points lower under
the ITC on average over the same period.
5.2.2 Aggregate Eﬀects
The paths of aggregate variables following the implementation of TCJA individual tax
provisions are shown in Figure 2. While eﬀective (productivity-weighted) labor supply
increases by 1.5% on average each year over 2018-2025 relative to baseline under both
tax systems, labor hours increase more under the ITC environment on average reﬂecting
the larger increase in hours of low productivity workers. The accumulation of ﬁnancial
deposits is 0.3 percentage points lower on average each year over the ﬁrst half the decade
under the ITC, reﬂecting the savings disincentives from joint taxation of labor and ordi-
nary capital income. As the diﬀerence in the stock of ﬁnancial deposits across tax systems
shrinks towards the middle of the budget window, so does diﬀerence in the ﬂow of mar-
ket consumption  from 0.6 percentage points in 2018 to 0.1 percentage points in 2022
 which is additionally bolstered by substitution away from tax-preferred consumption
choices under the ITC.
The relatively slower accumulation of ﬁnancial deposits under the ITC facilitates a
relatively higher borrowing rate for ﬁrms, thereby slowing the accumulation of physical
capital. While the stock of capital is 0.1 percentage points lower over average over 2018-
2015 under the ITC, the average annual diﬀerence in aggregate output across tax systems
in negligible over this period. Nonetheless, the combination of a lower stock of deposits
and relatively higher concentration of low-productivity labor in the ﬁrst half of the budget
window leads to a larger federal tax revenue loss under the ITC by 0.4 percentage points.
Lower tax revenues result in a higher level of public debt than that predicted under the
CTS by 0.6 percentage points by the end of 2027.
Figure 3 decomposes the change to federal tax revenues across the returns to labor and
capital, omitting the tax revenues from accidental bequests. While the cumulative total
of (taxable and non-taxable) labor income over the budget window is about $80 billion
higher under the ITC, the cumulative total of labor income taxes is about $60 billion
lower. The inverse directions of income and taxes is due to the relative concentration of
low-productivity household labor increases, who generally face lower eﬀective tax rates on
ordinary income. The cumulative totals of (taxable and non-taxable) capital income and
capital income taxes are approximately $305 billion and $37 billion higher under the ITC,
as the recipients of taxable capital income generally face higher eﬀective tax rates under
this tax system. Considering together that the labor and capital income tax receipts
go in opposite directions, the net diﬀerence in total tax receipts across tax systems is
only $23 billion. Thus, the net diﬀerence masks substantial variation in changes to the
distribution of pre- and post-tax returns to labor and capital.
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5.3 Policy Experiment 2: TCJA Corporate Tax Rate Reduction
We simulate the enactment of the corporate rate reduction as in Title II of JCT (2017),
which became eﬀective beginning in calendar year 2018. The reduction in the statutory
rate on corporate income from previous law to a single 21% rate was estimated to have
a conventional revenue loss of $1.349 trillion over ﬁscal years 2018-2027 in JCT (2017),
which is matched under both the ITC and CTS tax systems.
We simulate the enactment of the corporate rate reduction as in Title II of JCT
(2017), which became eﬀective beginning in calendar year 2018. The reduction in the
statutory rate on corporate income from previous law to a single 21% rate was estimated
to have a conventional revenue loss of $1.349 trillion over ﬁscal years 2018-2027 in JCT
(2017), which is matched under both the ITC and CTS tax systems.
5.3.1 Household Behavior
The reduction in the marginal tax rate applied to corporate income results in physical
capital moving from the non-corporate to the corporate sector, with a subsequent increase
in corporate dividend payments and capital gains realizations, and a decrease in non-
corporate distributions, in households' reallocated portfolios. This increase in preferred
capital income and reduction in ordinary capital income is associated with an implicit
reduction in the eﬀective tax rate applied to all ordinary income, which includes labor
income when taxed jointly as under the ITC. High productivity households, who are
generally those with large quantities of taxable capital income, will then experience a
greater eﬀective tax rate reduction and an incentive to increase labor hours and savings.
Under the ITC, the highest two productivity single and married households increase
average annual labor hours by 0.2% and 0.3% relative to baseline over 2018-2027. This
contrasts with the CTS, where capital income taxation is independent of labor income
taxation, as these households exhibit approximately no change in labor hours. With lower
eﬀective tax rates under the ITC, these high productivity single and married households
respond to the savings incentive by increasing their stock of ﬁnancial deposits by a budget-
window annual average of 0.2 and 0.4 percentage points more than under the CTS. The
policy-induced savings behavior of these households account for the largest change to the
stock of deposits and ﬂow of capital income under both tax systems.
For households with little taxable capital income, the strength of the labor supply
incentives created by the portfolio re-balancing eﬀect is negligible. The labor response
along the substitution margin is primarily driven by changes to the pre-tax wage rate
for these households, which increases by 0.1 percentage points less under the ITC due
to the greater change in the labor supply of high-productivity workers. Consequentially,
we observe the lowest three productivity single and married households to have higher
average annual labor hours under the CTS by 1.2 and 0.1 percentage points over the
budget window. Nonetheless, these relatively low productivity households tend to reduce
labor hours towards the end of their working life in response to the income eﬀect of a
higher wage rate and rate of return to ﬁnancial deposits.
5.3.2 Aggregate Eﬀects
The paths of aggregate variables following the implementation of the TCJA corporate
rate reduction are shown in Figure 4. While eﬀective labor supply increases under both
tax systems, it is higher under the ITC by an annual average of 0.2 percentage points
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over 2018-2027. In spite of this, labor hours are about 0.2 percentage points lower under
the ITC on average over this period. This result reﬂects the portfolio re-balancing eﬀect,
which generates an increase in labor supply by high productivity households under the
ITC. With a similar capital accumulation response across tax systems, this diﬀerential
in eﬀective labor supply causes a diﬀerential in aggregate output of about 0.2 percentage
points over the budget window. Higher output under the ITC is associated with relatively
smaller tax revenue loss, resulting in a stock of public debt that is 1.0 percentage points
lower at the end of the budget window.
The total diﬀerence in the federal tax revenue loss over the budget window under the
ITC is approximately $119 billion smaller than under the CTS, omitting the taxation
of accidental bequests. Figure 5 decomposes this substantial diﬀerence across the total
(taxable and non-taxable) returns to labor and capital. The ten-year cumulative ﬂows
of labor and capital income are higher under the ITC by $224 billion and $332 billion,
which reﬂect the relative sensitive labor supply and savings responses of high productivity
households to this particular policy change under the ITC. As these high-income house-
holds are subject to relatively higher eﬀective tax rates under a progressive tax system,
these changes are associated with about $50 billion and $69 billion more in labor and
capital income taxes collected after ten years under the ITC.
6 Conclusion
Macroeconomic analysis of large tax legislation packages often involves two stages: First,
a microsimulation outside of the macroeconomic model is used to calculate tax changes for
households and compute a change to eﬀective marginal and average aggregate tax rates
for each source of income. Second, these changes are then used to calibrate tax functions
that are imposed exogenously onto agents within the model. In this paper, we combine
these stages by embedding an internal tax calculator within a heterogeneous-agent model
so that decision makers within the model internalize the eﬀect that their particular choices
and demographics have on their tax liability under the policy change. The innovation of
this approach is that the tax treatment of preferred and ordinary capital income ﬂows,
which are taxed separately and explicitly according to their respective statutory rate
schedules rather than as a single tax base. Ordinary capital income is then taxed jointly
with labor income while explicitly accounting for endogenous values of deductions and
credits that may cause deviations from eﬀective and statutory rates.
We have explored the extent to which these modeling choices matter for an analy-
sis of two subsets of tax provisions in Public Law 115-97, known as the Tax Cuts and
Jobs Act': i) the individual provisions, and ii) the corporate tax rate reduction. We ﬁnd
that our internal tax calculator approach captures incentives created by the tax changes
not captured by the conventional approach. In each case, the care taken in explicitly
modeling tax provisions under the internal tax calculator has meaningful quantitative
implications both at the microeconomic and macroeconomic level. Our ﬁndings imply
that abstracting from tax detail in heterogeneous-agent models may come at the expense
of completely accounting for household incentives, and therefore the ability reliably es-
timate macroeconomic responses  especially the resulting tax consequences of changes
to the returns to labor and capital  to policy changes.
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7 Figures
7.1 Individual TCJA Provisions
Figure 1: Changes to Tax-Preferred Consumption: Individual TCJA Provisions
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Figure 2: Changes to Aggregates: Individual TCJA Provisions
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Figure 3: Changes to Factor Returns and Taxes: Individual TCJA Provisions
Labor Income: wage income and social security beneﬁts
Taxes: federal income taxes attributable to labor and social security beneﬁts; payroll taxes
Capital Income: pass-through distributions; corporate dividends; interest; capital gains; corporate proﬁts
Taxes: federal income taxes attributable to the above sources
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7.2 TCJA Corporate Rate Reduction
Figure 4: Changes to Aggregates: TCJA Corporate Rate Reduction
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Figure 5: Changes to Factor Returns and Taxes: TCJA Corporate Rate Reduction
Labor Income: wage income and social security beneﬁts
Taxes: federal income taxes attributable to labor and social security beneﬁts; payroll taxes
Capital Income: pass-through distributions; corporate dividends; interest; capital gains; corporate proﬁts
Taxes: federal income taxes attributable to the above sources
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A Calibration
A.1 Non-Tax Policy Parameters Values and Targets
A.1.1 Household Demographics, Preferences, and Characteristics
As the household sector of our model utilizes the framework developed in Moore and Pec-
oraro (2018b), the calibration strategy for household demographics, preferences, charac-
teristics generally follows that described in Sections A.1.1, A.1.3, and A.2 of that paper.
However, since we currently specify an initial year of 2017 instead of 2018,1 both the
exogenously and endogenously calibrated parameter values may vary from Moore and
Pecoraro (2018b) despite the same calibration strategy and targets, key of which are re-
ported in Tables A2 and A3. For this reason Table A1 contains the currently used values
for the same set select exogenous parameters previously reported. Only two deviations
from the prior calibration strategy for the household sector are made in this paper, which
are described below.
The instantaneous utility function is altered from Moore and Pecoraro (2018b) to
account the eﬀect of children at home on the supply of market labor hours. In the spirit
of Guner et al. (2011), we specify the following utility function:
U z,ft,j ≡

log(x∗j)− ψs
(nj+ϕ
sνz,fj )
1+ζs
1+ζs
− F s if f = s
log(x∗j)− ψm,1
(n1j )
1+ζm,1
1+ζm,1
− ψm,2 (n2j+ϕmν
z,m
j )
1+ζm,2
1+ζm,2
− Fm if f = m
where the additive product along with labor hour in the disutility for labor function,
ϕfνz,fj , captures the interaction between lifecycle disutility of work and the presence of
children. We let νz,fj be the number of dependents under the age of 6 for a given (j, z, f)
demographic, which are calculated using the Joint Committee on Taxations' Individual
Tax Model (ITM) for 2017.2 The parameter ϕf is set equal to 0.094 so that parents
spend about 520 hours per children each year, (Hotz and Miller, 1988), which is broadly
consistent with the time value speciﬁed by Guner et al. (2011).
We deﬁne labor income to be equal to the NIPA-comparable wage concept used Moore
and Pecoraro (2018b).3 That is, we do not include a share of pass-through income in our
labor income deﬁnition for purposes of sorting households by labor income productivity
as previously speciﬁed. Relative to the implicit composite income concept, we can better
account for the joint tax treatment of pass-through and wage income because the ex-
panded production sector in this model allows for the explicit decomposition of capital
income across diﬀerent types.
1Parameters calibrated to the single year 2018 in Moore and Pecoraro (2018b) are calibrated to the
single year 2017 here, while parameters calibrated from 2018-2028 projections in the former paper are
calibrated from 2017-2027 projections presented in The Budget and Economic Outlook: 2017 to 2027.
2For a description of the Joint Committee on Taxation's Individual Tax Model, see JCT (2015)
3Our `NIPA-comparable' measure is computed using the ITM by adding to AGI wage income (i) com-
bat pay, (ii) employers' share of the FICA tax, (iii) deferred 401k compensation, (iv) employers share of
401k compensation, (v) employer provided dependent care, (vi) employer health-insurance compensation,
(vii) employer HSA compensation, and (viii) employer life-insurance compensation.
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A.1.2 Firm Production Technology, Financing, and Housing
As our current speciﬁcation of ﬁrm production technology and the housing sector follow
from Moore and Pecoraro (2018b), the calibration strategy for computing parameter
values for factor shares, economic depreciation rates, capital adjustment costs, housing
transaction costs and minimums remain the same as that described in Section A.1.2 of
that paper. Those parameter values are reported in Table A1 below. The strategy for
calibrating the additional parameter values used in our current two-sector framework are
described below, and summarized in Table A3 .
Both the corporate and non-corporate ﬁrms are assumed to ﬁnance operations with
some combination of debt and equity such that each representative ﬁrm maintains a
constant debt to physical capital ratio κb,q for q = c, n. These parameter values are set
to κb,c = 0.435 and κb,n = 0.085 to target an initial steady state ratio of interest expense
to aggregate output for the corporate and non-corporate sectors of 0.039 and 0.003, which
are computed from the SOI and NIPA for 2016.
While distributions of pass-through income to households from the non-corporate
ﬁrm are computed as a residual from the non-corporate ﬁrm's cash ﬂow equation, the
corporate ﬁrm distributes dividends to households as a κd portion of after-tax earnings.
This parameter is set to κd = 0.15, which targets the ratio of net dividends of domestic
C-corporations to aggregate output of 0.031 as measured by NIPA for 2016.
So that the model can reproduce the relative sizes of output produced by corporate
and not corporate entities, we incorporate time-invariant scale parameters Zq for q = c, n
on the ﬁrms' production functions. Targeting the ratio of corporate gross receipts to
total business gross receipts equal to 0.692 as computed from the SOI for 2016, we set
Zc = 1.03 and Zn = 1.
A.1.3 Government: Public Capital and Debt
The level productive public capital is set endogenously so that in the initial steady state
we observe ratios of federal and state-local public capital to output of 18.4% and 55.1%,
which are the average observed values over 2007-2016 from NIPA.
The rate of return on public debt is parameterized function of the deviation of the
deﬁcit to output ratio from the corresponding steady state value. The parameter $
determines the steady state rate of interest on public debt, and is set so that net interest
payments relative to output in the initial steady state match the average value projected
over 2017-2027 in The Budget and Economic Outlook: 2017 to 2027, which is 2.1%. The
parameter ς determines the response of the interest rate to changes in the deﬁcit to output
ratio, and is set equal to 0.0198, which implies that the interest rate increases by 2 basis
points for every 1 percent increase in the deﬁcit to output ratio above the steady state
value, and vice versa (Gamber and Seliski, 2019; Huntley, 2014).
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A.2 Tables
Table A1: Select Exogenous Parameters
Demographics
Terminal ages R, J 40, 66
Rate of population growth υP 0.0076
Production
Rate of technological progress υA 0.0108
Private capital share of output α 0.3265
Public capital share of output g 0.0352
Private capital depreciation rate δK 0.0799
Corporate dividend payout ratio κd 0.150
Debt-capital ratio κb,c, κb,n 0.435, 0.085
Output scale parameter Zc, Zn 1.03, 1.00
Private capital adjustment cost parameter ξK 6
Housing
Owner-occupied housing minimum down-payment γ 0.20
Housing status adjustment cost φo, φr 0.05, 0.05
Housing services depreciation rate δo, δr 0.0555, 0.0570
Owner-occupied housing minimum (ITC) ho 1.00
Owner-occupied housing minimum(CTS) ho 0.96
Preferences
Subjective discount factor β 0.985
Non-housing consumption share of composite σ 0.295
Housing/non-housing consumption substitution elasticity η 0.487
Utility curvature parameter ζf, 5
Intensive labor margin disutility (ITC) ψs,ψm,1,ψm,2 393.0, 305.1, 89.7
Intensive labor margin disutility (CTS) ψs,ψm,1,ψm,2 405.6, 309.0, 102.0
Extensive labor margin ﬁxed cost (ITC) φs, φm 0.430, 0.214
Extensive labor margin ﬁxed cost (CTS) φs, φm 0.505, 0.203
Children disutility parameter ϕf 0.094
Government
Public capital depreciation rate δg 0.0317
Debt - interest rate response ς 0.0198
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Table A2: Targeted and Baseline Actual Employment Status by Type of Worker
Type of Worker Data (MEPS) Model: ITC Model: CTS
FT PT U FT PT U FT PT U
Single 0.61 0.24 0.15 0.61 0.24 0.15 0.61 0.24 0.15
Married Primary 0.90 0.08 0.25 0.90 0.10 0.00 0.90 0.10 0.00
Married Secondary 0.42 0.32 0.26 0.41 0.33 0.25 0.42 0.32 0.25
Totals may not sum to 1 due to rounding
Table A3: Targeted and Baseline Actual Aggregate Ratios
Target Ratio Data Model: ITC Model: CTS
Homeownership ratio 0.639 (AHS) 0.639 0.640
Private business investment to
total private investment ratio 0.465 (BEA) 0.473 0.478
Private business investment to
output ratio 0.162 (BEA) 0.163 0.162
Corporate gross interest expense to
output ratio 0.039 (SOI/BEA) 0.038 0.038
Noncorporate gross interest expense to
output ratio 0.003 (SOI/BEA) 0.003 0.003
Corporate net dividends to
output ratio 0.031 (BEA) 0.030 0.030
Corporate gross receipts to
total business gross receipts ratio 0.692 (SOI) 0.710 0.710
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B Trend-Stationary Equilibrium
The model is transformed into trend-stationary form as described in Appendix B.1 of
Moore and Pecoraro (2018b) so that a stationary solution method can be used to solve
the model. The solution method used here generally follows the algorithm laid out in
Appendix C of Moore and Pecoraro (2018b). We deﬁne our equilibrium in terms of the
transformed model where the tilde accent denotes a variable that has been de-trended
for exogenous population and/or technological growth.
For each age cohort, j, productivity type, z, and family composition f , households
have ordinary consumption, c˜i, charitable giving, c˜g, market labor hours, n, n1, and n2,
owner-occupied housing services consumption, h˜o, rental housing services consumption
h˜r, ﬁnancial assets a˜, and future net worth y˜′, as control variables. Households have cur-
rent net worth y˜ as their endogenous individual state variable, and their age, productivity
type, as family composition as their exogenous state variables. Household choices of home
production c˜h and child-care costs κ˜ depend exogenously on a household's contempora-
neous choice of market labor supply, while end-of-life expenditures c˜eol and accidental
bequests ˜beq depend exogenously on a household's net worth state and the time of death.
Corporate and non-corporate ﬁrms, valued at V˜ c and V˜ n, have eﬀective labor inputs
N˜ c and N˜n, and future private capital stocks K˜c
′
and K˜n
′
as control variables, with
current private capital stocks K˜c and K˜n as state variables.
Endogenous aggregate state variables are eﬀective market labor supply N˜ , owner-
occupied housing capital H˜o, rental housing capital H˜r, deposits D˜, private consumption
C˜t, ﬁnancial intermediary income ˜Inc, private business capital K˜, public capital G˜, pri-
vate bonds B˜, public bonds B˜g, and federal, state, and local tax instruments and transfer
payments associated with given tax system, the set of which are denoted by T.
Deﬁnition 1. A perfect-foresight trend-stationary recursive equilibrium is com-
prised of a measure of households Ω˜z,ft,j , a household value function V
z,f
t,j (y˜), a collec-
tion of household decision rules {c˜i;z,ft,j (y˜), c˜g;z,ft,j (y˜), nz,st,j (y˜), nz,m,1t,j (y˜), nz,m,2t,j (y˜), h˜o;z,ft,j (y˜),
h˜r;z,ft,j (y˜), a˜
z,f
t,j (y˜); y˜
z,f
t+1,j+1(y˜)}, a set of ﬁrm values {V˜ ct (K˜t
c
), V˜ nt (K˜
n
t )}, a collection of ﬁrm
decision rules {N˜ ct (K˜t
c
), N˜nt (K˜t
n
); K˜ct+1(K˜t
c
), K˜nt+1(K˜t
n
)}, prices {w˜t, prt , Rct , Rnt , it, ρt, rpt },
aggregates {N˜t, H˜ot , H˜rt , D˜t, C˜t, ˜Inct, K˜t, G˜t, B˜t, B˜gt }, and the set of tax instruments and
transfers T associated with given tax system such that:
1. Household' decision rules are solutions to their constrained optimization problem.
2. Macroeconomic aggregates are consistent with household behavior such that:
N˜t =
∫
Z
∫
J
Ω˜z,st,j z
z,s
j n
z,s
t,j (y˜) + Ω˜
z,m
t,j z
z,m
j
(
nz,1t,j (y˜) + n
z,2
t,j (y˜)
)
dj dz
H˜ot =
∫
Z
∫
J
∑
f=s,m
Ω˜z,ft,j h˜
o;z,f
t,j (y˜) dj dz
H˜rt =
∫
Z
∫
J
∑
f=s,m
Ω˜z,ft,j h˜
r;z,f
t,j (y˜) dj dz
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D˜t =
∫
Z
∫
J
∑
f=s,m
Ω˜z,ft,j a˜
z,f
t,j (y˜) dj dz
C˜t =
∫
Z
∫
J
∑
f=s,m
Ω˜z,ft,j
(
(c˜i;z,ft,j (y˜)− c˜h;z,ft,j ) + c˜g;z,ft,j (y˜) + κ˜z,ft,j
)
dj dz + c˜eolt
3. Firms' decision rules are solutions to their constrained optimization problem.
4. Macroeconomic aggregates are consistent with ﬁrm behavior such that:
N˜t =
∑
q=c,n
N˜ qt (K˜t
q
)
K˜t+1 =
∑
q=c,n
K˜qt+1(K˜t
q
)
B˜t =
∑
q=c,n
κb,qK˜t
q
5. Perfectly competitive labor markets clear so that the marginal product of eﬀective
labor is equalized across sectors:
w˜t = (1− α− g)G˜gt (K˜ct )α(N˜ ct )−α−g = (1− α− g)G˜gt (K˜nt )α(N˜nt )−α−g
6. The asset market clears such that:
D˜t+1 = V˜
c
t+1 + V˜
n
t+1 + B˜
c
t+1 + B˜
n
t+1 + B˜
g
t+1 +H
r
t + H˜
r
t (ΥPΥA)
−1
where assets are priced to eliminate any arbitrage opportunities:
Rct = R
n
t = (1− τ it )it = (1− τ rt )prt − δr
and the ﬁnancial intermediary is willing to accept `safe-asset' pricing of federal
government bonds so that:
ρt = $ + ς exp
(
B˜gt+1ΥPΥA − B˜gt
Y˜t
− B˜
g
SS(ΥPΥA − 1)
Y˜SS
)
Furthermore, the rate of return paid to households on deposits is determined by
application of a zero proﬁt condition so that:
rpt = D˜
−1
t
˜Inct
7. The goods market clears such that:∑
q=c,n
Zq(Gt)
g(Kqt )
α(AtN
q
t )
1−α−g = C˜t + I˜t + G˜t
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where private aggregate investment is deﬁned as:
I˜t ≡ I˜ct + I˜nt + I˜ot + I˜rt + Φ˜Ht
with:
I˜ct = K˜
c
t+1(ΥPΥA)− (1− δK)K˜ct + Ξct
I˜nt = K˜
n
t+1(ΥPΥA)− (1− δK)K˜nt + Ξnt
I˜ot = H˜
o
t+1(ΥPΥA)− (1− δo)H˜ot
I˜rt = H˜
r
t − (1− δr)H˜rt−1(ΥPΥA)−1
Φ˜Ht =
∫
Z
∫
J
∑
f=s,m
Ω˜z,ft,j
(
φoh˜o;z,ft+1,j+1(y˜) + φ
rh˜r;z,ft+1,j+1(y˜)
)
dj dz
and where aggregate government expenditures is deﬁned as:
G˜t ≡ C˜fedt + C˜slt + I˜fedt + I˜slt
with:
I˜fedt = G˜
fed
t+1(ΥPΥA)− (1− δg)G˜slt
I˜slt = G˜
sl
t+1(ΥPΥA)− (1− δg)G˜slt
8. The federal government's debt follows the law of motion:
B˜gt+1(ΥPΥA) = C˜
fed
t + I˜
fed
t + T˜R
fed
t − ( ˜txl
hh
t +
˜txl
c
t +
˜txl
beq
t ) + (1 + ρt)B˜
g
t
and maintains a ﬁscally sustainable path so that:
lim
k→∞
B˜gt+k∏k−1
s=0(1 + ρt+s)
= 0
where federal tax receipts from households, ﬁrms, and bequests are:
˜txl
hh
t =
∫
Z
∫
J
∑
f=s,m
(
o˜it
z,f
t,j + c˜it
z,f
t,j + τ
pr
t
ˆ˜iz,ft,j
)
Ω˜z,ft,j dj dz
˜txl
c
t = τ
c
t
(
Y˜ ct − w˜tN˜ ct − ˜ded
c
t
)
− ˜crdct
˜txl
beq
t = τ
beq
t (1− Λ) (ΥA)
∫
Z
∫
J
(1− pij)
∑
f=s,m
Ω˜z,ft,j y˜t+1,j+1 dj dz
and transfers are:
T˜R
fed
t =
∫
Z
∫
J
∑
f=s,m
(
s˜sz,ft,j + ˜trs
z,f
t,j
)
Ω˜z,ft,j dj dz
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9. The state and local composite government maintains a balanced budget:
s˜lt
hh
t + s˜lt
c
t = C˜
sl
t + I˜
sl
t
where net state and local tax receipts from households and corporations are:
s˜lt
hh
t =
∫
Z
∫
J
∑
f=s,m
τ slt iˆ
z,f
t,j + τ
slp
t h
o
t,jΩ
z,f
t,j dj dz
s˜lt
c
t = τ
slc
t
(
Y˜ ct − w˜tN˜ ct − itB˜ct
)
10. The measure of households is time-invariant:
Ω˜z,ft+1,j = Ω˜
z,f
t,j
11. The net worth of households that die before reaching the maximum age J is allocated
to end-of-life consumption expenditures to bequests among the living such that:
c˜eolt = Λ (ΥA)
∫
Z
∫
J
(1− pij)
∑
f=s,m
Ω˜z,ft,j y˜t+1,j+1 dj dz
˜beqt = (1− τ beqt )(1− Λ) (ΥA)
∫
Z
∫
J
(1− pij)
∑
f=s,m
Ω˜z,ft,j y˜t+1,j+1 dj dz
Deﬁnition 2. A steady-state perfect-foresight trend-stationary recursive equi-
librium is a perfect-foresight stationary recursive equilibrium, where every growth-adjusted
aggregate variable is time invariant.
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